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Brazil’s Place in the Global Economy 
Arturo C. Porzecanski1 
 
Brazil is a country with long-standing ambitions for a major role in the world economy, but 
its footprint remains relatively modest. This chapter documents the extent to which Brazil’s 
economy remains fairly inward-looking and isolated from global markets, despite the 
modernizing reforms of the past generation. It then discusses some of the causes, which 
include both contingent economic factors and conscious foreign-policy choices. It concludes 
with a discussion of potential policy changes that could enable Brazil to bridge the gap 
between global ambitions and achievements.  
 
Brazil’s Significance in the World Economy 
Brazil has enjoyed political and economic stability and an increasingly favorable external 
environment during the past two decades, but its economic accomplishments at home and 
on the world economic stage have been relatively modest, and thus the country’s influence 
and prestige have remained quite limited. 
Its impressive geographical and economic size is indisputable: Brazil is the world’s 
fifth-largest country in terms of territorial extension, coming after Russia, China, the United 
States and Canada; the fifth most populous country, surpassed only by China, India, the 
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United States and Indonesia; and in terms of the value-added of its economic output, 
adjusted for international differentials in purchasing power, it is the seventh-largest 
economy, after the United States, China, India, Japan, Germany and Russia. 
However, despite these oft-cited headline indicators, Brazil casts a much smaller 
shadow when put in its proper context. The country’s extensive land area (8.5 million square 
kilometers), as continental-sized as it is, represents but 6.5 percent of the world’s total, and 
includes just five percent of the planet’s arable land.i Its territory is relatively lightly settled, 
such that Brazil’s 200 million residents account for less than three percent of the world’s 
total population, significantly less than China’s 19 percent and India’s 17.6 percent shares of 
total. Brazil’s production of goods and services, even once adjusted for purchasing-power 
differentials, is likewise valued at less than three percent of the world’s total, as opposed to 
the United States, which accounts for nearly 20 percent and China over 15 percent of global 
output. 
Figure 1: Main Indicators of Brazil’s Place in the World 
 
Rank Land area* Population** GDP***
1 Russia 16.4 China 1,357.4 United States 16.8
2 China 9.3 India 1,252.1 China 13.4
3 United States 9.1 United States 316.1 India 5.1
4 Canada 9.1 Indonesia 249.9 Japan 4.7
5 Brazil 8.5 Brazil 200.4 Germany 3.2
6 Australia 7.7 Pakistan 182.1 Russia 2.6
7 India 3.0 Nigeria 173.6 Brazil 2.4
8 Argentina 2.7 Bangladesh 156.6 United Kingdom 2.4
9 Kazakhstan 2.7 Russia 143.5 France 2.3
10 Algeria 2.4 Japan 127.3 Mexico 1.8
World 129.7 World 7124.5 World 87.0
Of which: Brazil 6.5% Of which: Brazil 2.8% Of which: Brazil 2.8%
* Millions of square kilometers in 2012. Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators , 2014.
** Millions of inhabitants in 2013. Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators , 2014.
*** Gross domestic product in 2013 based on purchasing-power-parity (PPP) valuation of country GDP,
        in trillions of U.S. dollars. Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database , Apr. 2014.
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Other relevant indicators of Brazil’s economic dimension in the world cut a relatively 
unimpressive figure. The country’s merchandise exports multiplied from an average of $1.5 
billion per annum during 1950-53 to over $60 billion by 2000-03, but because other 
countries’ exports expanded even faster during that half-century, Brazil’s share of world 
exports actually dropped from over two percent to under one percent of total. In the past 
decade, Brazilian exports have vaulted to the vicinity of $250 billion per year during 2011-13, 
and although this surge led to relative gains, and the country’s market share rose, Brazil’s 
nowadays accounts for only around 1.2 percent of total world exports.ii 
Moreover, Brazil remains a particularly inward-looking economy even in comparison 
with other large, continental-sized nations, which naturally tend to be more self-sufficient 
and thus less dependent on cross-border trade and financial flows than medium-sized – 
never mind small – economies. In countries such as Canada, Mexico, South Africa and 
Russia, exports of goods and services are equivalent to around 30 percent of their GDP; and 
in India, Indonesia and Turkey, the export sector represents about one-quarter of their 
GDP. In Brazil, in contrast, exports of goods and services have represented less than 13 
percent of GDP throughout 2009-13.iii  
Mineral, agricultural and other primary products account for over half of Brazil’s total 
exports, with many products that are classified as “manufactured” actually involving the 
processing of raw materials; for example, exports of orange juice are counted as 
manufactured goods. It is estimated that the proportion of total Brazilian exports embodying 
“high technology” has decreased from over ten percent of total exports in 2000 to five 
percent by 2010 (Canuto, 2013). The share of manufactured goods incorporating these high 
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technologies, in turn, has likewise shrunk from roughly one-fifth of total manufactures in 
2001 to a mere one-tenth by 2012.iv Even manufactured export goods incorporating low 
levels of technology slid from over 13 percent to under ten percent of total exports between 
2000 and 2010. And this decrease in the content of technology in Brazilian exports was not 
solely the result of the intervening boom in commodity sales abroad; rather, it also reflected 
slow growth in exports of manufactured goods embodying technology (Canuto et al., 2013).  
Brazilian exports are also characterized by the fact that they involve a relatively small 
proportion of imported inputs, a sign that Brazil is only marginally integrated into global 
production chains. For instance, estimates of the contribution of offshored intermediate 
inputs to the production of goods that are then exported show that Brazil is one of the most 
self-sufficient of nations, with no more than one-tenth of the value-added of its exports 
incorporating foreign-made inputs. This very low share compares to more than one-fifth of 
export value-added in the case of Canada and India, and about one-third of same in China 
and Mexico.v 
Brazil’s self-sufficiency means that its economy is not as connected to global 
production as those of its peers, and thus the country is slow to benefit from quality 
improvements, technological upgrades and price reductions taking place elsewhere in the 
world. Indeed, Brazil has served as a platform for national and multinational producers to 
satisfy the needs of the large (and relatively protected) domestic market, or else as a platform 
to export primary and manufactured goods made almost entirely in Brazil. The resulting self-
sufficiency has contributed to Brazil’s relative isolation from the world’s multiplying 
production chains, and thus to the country’s relatively low international economic profile. 
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Brazil also cuts a very modest figure in terms of international financial, and not 
merely trade, connections. To begin with, the local currency, the Real (BRL), is hardly traded 
in the international currency markets, a further sign of the economy’s marginal integration 
into the global market. According to the latest and most authoritative survey of currency 
turnover in the world, the BRL figured in 0.6 percent of all spot transactions taking place 
during the sample month of April 2013. This compares to a 1.7 percent share for the heavily 
regulated Chinese yuan (CNY), 1.8 percent for the Russian ruble (RUB), and 2.8 percent for 
the Mexican peso (MXN). Even the Indian rupee (INR), the Turkish lira (TRY) and the 
South African rand (ZAR) trade more frequently in the spot currency market than does the 
Brazilian Real.vi 
In the foreign exchange swap market, which is marginally larger than the spot market 
– the equivalent of $2.2 trillion/day in swaps, versus $2.0 trillion/day in spot transactions – 
the BRL was involved in an insignificant 0.04 percent of all transactions taking place around 
the world during the sample month of April 2013. This compared to a swap-market 
presence of 1.8 percent of total transactions for the (partially inconvertible) Chinese yuan 
and 2.6 percent of total for the (fully convertible) Mexican peso, just to mention two more 
heavily traded emerging-market currencies.vii 
In terms of the international reserves and other foreign assets owned by the Brazilian 
public and private sectors – foreign currencies, stocks, bonds, real estate, and the like – these 
amounted to an estimated $731 billion as of the end of 2012 – more than double those in 
2006, and by far the largest number in Brazil’s history. However, this wealth represents a 
mere 0.56 percent of what all other countries own in terms of their combined cross-border 
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assets. Brazil’s $731 billion was also one-seventh of mainland China’s international assets, 
and roughly one half of Russia’s, cross-border assets as of the same date.viii 
Brazil’s foreign direct investments around the world (namely, investments entailing at 
least a ten-percent ownership stake) were estimated at about $373 billion as of end-2012, and 
foreign portfolio investments at the equivalent of $271 billion. To put them in proper 
perspective, these components of Brazil’s international assets were 3.19 percent and 0.93 
percent, respectively, of the world total of such cross-border investments.ix In other words, 
Brazil’s multinational companies and investments may have expanded a great deal abroad in 
the past decade, but they represent a small dot in the huge universe of cross-border direct 
and portfolio investing. 
Figure 2: Additional Indicators of Brazil’s Place in the World (as of 2012, except as 
noted) 
 
In terms of the international liabilities owed by the Brazilian public and private 
sectors to foreign direct and portfolio investors, and also to foreign banks and suppliers, 
these amounted to an estimated $1.6 trillion as of the end of 2012. This figure is likewise 
Amount ($ billions) % of World Total
Merchandise trade, 2013 487 1.27
Merchandise exports, FOB 242 1.21
Merchandise imports, CIF 245 1.34
International assets 731 0.56
Official international reserves 373 3.19
Outward foreign direct investment 271 0.93
Outward foreign portfolio investment 22 0.06
International liabilities 1,583 0.73
Inward foreign direct investment 745 2.57
Inward foreign portfolio investment 639 1.30
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics , June 2014.
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more than double the amount of external liabilities the country had in 2006, and by far the 
largest number in Brazil’s history. There is no question that in recent years Brazil has 
attracted many foreign investors to its shores. Nevertheless, the $1.6 trillion captured by 
Brazil represents a mere 0.73 percent of the cross-border loans and direct and portfolio 
investments that all of the world’s countries had managed to attract as of end-2012.x 
In sum, despite Brazil’s recent rise in global rankings of gross domestic product (on a 
purchasing-power adjusted basis), which moved the country from eight in the world in 1990 
to seventh place by 2013, a comeback from the sixth place it had held back in 1980, the 
figures above document the continued inward-looking nature of the economy.xi Brazil is one 
of the most self-sufficient economies in the world. To state this in less positive terms: it is 
one of the least internationalized of the large economies, with its manufacturing base 
increasingly marginalized from global production chains. While Brazil’s scale provides it with 
the luxury of a large and expanding domestic market, the rapid rise of a modernizing China 
and the increasing competitiveness of East Asian, Western and Eastern European, and Latin 
American countries suggest that Brazilian industry is and will likely remain at a disadvantage 
despite well-meaning policies enacted in Brasilia.  
 
Brazil’s Economic Statecraft 
How has this come to pass? Brazilian policymakers, after all, came to recognize during the 
1980s the limits of state-led, import-substituting industrialization. They have since sought a 
“middle way” between the continuation of past nationalist, interventionist economic policies 
and the neoliberal alternative that became fashionable in much of Latin America – never 
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mind in the formerly Communist countries, most of which embraced free-market capitalism 
with gusto. This section suggests a number of causes for Brazil’s economic policy choices, 
some more strategic than others, which have culminated in Brazil’s relative isolation from 
global markets, and for the adoption of public policies that are not up to the task. 
 
Economic Performance 
First and foremost, Brazil’s footprint on the world economic stage is light because, whether 
as cause or consequence, its economic performance has been mixed by world standards. In 
the long period from 1980 through 2013, per capita incomes in Brazil, measured on an 
inflation-adjusted basis, increased by a total of 35 percent. The economy actually experienced 
a contraction in per capita GDP in 12 out of the 343 years, or in more than one-third of the 
time elapsed. Thus, Brazil has made economic progress in what could be characterized as a 
“two steps forward, one step back” pattern – certainly so up until the mid-2000s.xii  
Figure 3: Brazil’s Gross Domestic Product per capita, constant prices (1980=100) 
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Meanwhile, during the same 1980-2013 period, the simple (unweighted) mean performance 
delivered by 109 emerging and developing countries excluding Brazil was a doubling of their 
GDP per capita – specifically, a 105 percent cumulative surge – and the median performance 
was a 60 percent increase. China was the star performer by a long shot: the country managed 
to multiply its 1980 per capita income by 16 times during the intervening 33 years, never 
experiencing a single recession year. Vietnam multiplied its GDP per capita by five times – 
not a single recession year there, either – and India and Thailand, notwithstanding a major 
setback in 1998, achieved a nearly four-fold increase in their living standards. Malaysia and 
Indonesia almost tripled their per capita incomes between 1980 and 2013, despite becoming 
victims of the Asian financial crisis; Chile registered a more than time-and-a-half (170 
percent) increase – impressive only by Latin American standards; and Poland doubled its 
economic standard of living even though it went through a wrenching transition from 
communism to capitalism.xiii 
 
Neo-developmentalism 
Second, as Vilela and Maia and Taylor (this volume) also note, despite the changes of the 
past generation, Brazilian policymakers have followed an economic development strategy 
that remains heavily influenced by the structuralist-inspired policies of the 1950s. Although 
policymakers in the 1980s and 1990s recognized the futility of autarchy and began to work 
toward opening the economy and lessening the burdensome role of the state, Brazil has 
embraced this policy set less than enthusiastically. Policymakers have retained the most 
important state-driven mechanisms of development, including the substantial role of the 
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national development bank (BNDES) as the large-scale source of subsidized-credit for 
companies deemed strategic, as well as the granting of tax breaks and protection from 
imports as tools of industrial promotion.  
The administration of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-10) reintroduced the 
concept of a strategic industrial policy with the launch of the Política Industrial, Tecnológica e de 
Comércio Exterior (Industrial, Technological and Foreign Trade Policy, or PITCE) in 
November 2003, this time with an export-promoting, rather than import-substituting, 
development objective. It was supplemented in May 2008 by a Política de Desenvolvimento 
Produtivo (Productive Development Policy, or PDP), administered by the state-owned 
National Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES), to help position Brazilian companies (e.g., 
in the mining, steel, aviation, and biofuels sectors) to become global leaders. Ever since then, 
BNDES has been picking and promoting suspected winners through generous long-term 
loans at concessional interest rates (Rojas, 2013). 
Most recently, this tendency is epitomized by the effort to build a domestic 
shipbuilding industry in the northeastern state of Pernambuco, as part of the drive to exploit 
the pre-salt oil finds in Brazilian coastal waters. The Brazilian government has been the 
principal investor (through a subsidiary of Petrobras), has implemented local-content 
restrictions, and has borne the costs of a production process that has been longer and 
considerably more expensive than purchasing ships from international competitors – all in 
the name of developing local shipbuilding capacity that might later be used in developing the 
(state-owned) coastal oilfields (DuBois and Primo, 2013).xiv   
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In her inaugural year in office, President Dilma Rousseff, Lula da Silva’s successor, 
quickened the pace of industrial policy and turned it sharply inward, starting in August 2011. 
The government first announced the Plano Brasil Maior (Plan Larger Brazil), a package mainly 
of tax breaks, in most cases conditional upon the use of Brazilian-made goods or on export 
performance objectives.xv The following month, the authorities imposed a 30 percent 
increase in the tax on manufactured products (IPI) for vehicles with less than 65 percent of 
their value added originating in Brazil, Argentina or Mexico (Brazil has preferential regimes 
for autos with Argentina and Mexico, the former in the context of Mercosul.) 
Subsequently, in October 2012, increases on 100 tariff lines were announced affecting 
mainly imported machinery, plastics, iron and steel, chemicals, paper and wood articles. 
Tariffs were raised between two and 18 percentage points, which resulted in new tariff levels 
of between 14 percent and 25 percent for affected imports. According to a recent report by 
the European Commission, Brazil, together with Argentina, South Africa, and Indonesia, are 
responsible for more than half of all new protectionist measures introduced in the period 
from October 2008 to May 2013 – and this even though they were little affected by the 
global financial crisis which impacted Europe, above all.xvi 
All of these efforts have been given theoretical backing by a revised version of state-
fostered economic development known as “neo-developmentalism,” a term coined by 
Brazilian economist and former policymaker Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira to define a 21st-
century alternative to the “Washington Consensus” orthodoxy (Ban, 2013; Bresser-Pereira, 
2009). Harkening back to the heady growth of the late 1960s and early 1970s, Bresser-Pereira 
describes a national developmentalist policy set that combines nascent industry protection 
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and state promotion of investment in potential industrial champions. The objective is to 
promote export-led industrialization supported by government intervention (including 
keeping the exchange rate competitive), in what appears to be a reprise of the East Asian 
model of development in the 1970s and 1980s.  
The siren song of neo-developmentalism and the practical policy choices of the Lula 
and Dilma administrations have set Brazil on a path reminiscent of the inward-looking 
policies that dominated policymaking from the 1930s through the debt crisis of 1982, albeit 
perhaps with slightly more emphasis on export promotion than on sheer import 
substitution. As Musacchio and Lazzarini (2014) note, these policies have developed their 
own homegrown constituency of proponents, including state-owned firms and their 
employees, as well as the large private-sector firms that have benefited from these policies 
and from various forms of government support, including national champions from diverse 
fields, from major construction multinationals to various banking giants. Furthermore, as we 
have already seen, the boom in commodity exports since 2003 provided the most sustained 
growth in per capita GDP since Brazil’s return to democracy, at least until it petered out in 
2011. Correctly or not, this growth spurt was credited to the neo-developmentalist agenda, 
providing it with credibility than is proving increasingly difficult to sustain now that 
domestic and international circumstances are no longer as favorable, and given limits to 
expansionary fiscal and monetary policies in Brazil. 
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The mixing of foreign policy and economic policy 
A third and perhaps unexpected motivation for Brazil’s inward-looking development policies 
results from choices made in the realm of economic diplomacy. Brazil is somewhat 
paradoxical in this regard. On the one hand, in terms of its economic statecraft – namely, the 
harnessing of global economic forces to advance Brazil’s foreign policy, and the use of 
foreign policy tools to further the country’s economic potential – the political and business 
elites in Brazil have responded to the centrifugal forces of economic globalization through a 
commitment to multilateralism. At the same time, however, for reasons that often have less 
to do with economic motivations than geopolitical strategy, the government has responded 
to the centripetal forces of regionalization by constraining itself via commitments to 
Mercosul, and to a lesser extent to Portuguese-speaking Africa. 
As other contributors to this volume note, Brazil has long pursued the resolution of 
world problems through multilateral approaches to economic development, international 
trade, and international security issues. In economic policy, Brazil has sought both greater 
influence and greater autonomy with some success, increasing its quota share in international 
financial institutions and building up the G20 into an influential participant in global 
economic policymaking. Brazil and other developing countries became influential voices in 
the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations that was launched in 1986 under the aegis of the 
General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, the predecessor of the WTO, the World 
Trade Organization). Brazil also played an important role in the start of the Doha Round of 
2001, the latest – and so far incomplete – attempt to curb protectionism affecting trade in 
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agriculture, services and intellectual property. Among developing countries, Brazil and India 
have been heavily involved in guiding the agenda and negotiations (Fishlow, 2011, p.168-73).  
Indeed, as Miles Kahler (2013, p.721) notes, Brazil has high capabilities in global 
economic governance. Through coalition building, the use of informal norms, and the 
extensive employment of formal dispute-resolution mechanisms, Brazil has become one of 
the most active and influential participants in the WTO. Despite failure to build consensus 
on a comprehensive trade deal, the earnest efforts of Brazil’s envoy to the WTO, 
Ambassador Roberto Azevêdo, gained him the credibility and gave him the visibility to be 
elected Director-General of the WTO in September 2013 for a four-year term. This election 
marked the first time that a national of Brazil became head of any of the global economic-
governance institutions. He was only the second of eight prior directors-general of the 
GATT/WTO to come from a developing country, which is no mean feat.xvii While 
resuscitating the moribund Doha Round is likely to be a herculean task, Azevêdo’s election 
is nonetheless a sign of Brazil’s ability to build influential coalitions within global economic 
institutions.  
Simultaneously, however, Brazil has committed to regional economic organizations 
that constrain its ability to participate effectively in global institutions. The reasons for doing 
so often have more to do with geopolitics than with economic self-interest. Perhaps most 
emblematically, in the last several decades, Brazil has supplemented its allegiance to 
multilateralism with a commitment to regional economic projects in South America and in 
Portuguese-speaking Africa. In the mid-1980s, a relationship blossomed between Brazil and 
Argentina as both countries celebrated the restoration of democracy and the end of a 
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military-era nuclear development race, and as both found themselves coping with a heavy 
legacy of government indebtedness, galloping inflation, and lack of access to foreign capital. 
Presidents José Sarney and Raúl Alfonsín grew close as each experimented with 
unconventional stabilization plans (the Cruzado Plan and the Austral Plan, respectively) and 
toyed with the idea of a unified response to foreign bank and official creditors. Adoption of 
more orthodox domestic economic policies led to coincidental trade-liberalization initiatives 
in both countries during 1988-91, whereby tariff walls were cut in half. This made it possible 
for Presidents Fernando Collor and Carlos Menem to enter into an alliance whereby tariff 
levels would be lowered further only for intra-regional trade (Fishlow, 2011, p.141-3). In 
March 1991, the Treaty of Asunción was signed, incorporating Paraguay and Uruguay into 
the trading arrangement that became known as Mercosul in Portuguese and as Mercosur in 
Spanish. 
From the outset, Mercosul was as much a regional economic bloc as it was an effort 
to tame historical tensions with Argentina. Soon after the treaty came into effect, however, 
Brazilian economic diplomacy began to envision that Mercosul could serve a larger, strategic 
purpose: Brazil would be able to boost its bargaining power in multilateral trade and other 
negotiations if it built a block of supporters in South America and beyond, perhaps in 
Portuguese-speaking Africa (Bernal-Meza, 2002). Mercosul provided the way to reconcile a 
pivot to regionalism with continued allegiance to multilateralism. “There is no doubt that a 
continental integration [process] will reinforce considerably our country’s potential 
development and international position” (Nogueira Baptista, 2008, p.237). Besides, 
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multilateralism “does not have the universality [of application] that it had hoped to achieve 
some day” (Souto Maior, 2004, p.187).  
Moreover, the search for regional prominence “was also an end in itself, which 
reflected historical beliefs among Brazilian foreign policy elites regarding the distinct destiny 
of their country. It was in particular a reflection of their awareness that beyond its potential 
to occupy a central or hegemonic position among its neighbors, Brazil was large enough to 
play a relevant role in the international order” (Gómez Mera, 2005, p.131-2). Under 
President Lula da Silva’s tenure, Brazil added a complex cooperation structure with other 
South American countries to its overall foreign policy agenda, and together with Argentina, 
pushed forcefully to include Venezuela in Mercosul, achieving full-member status in 2012. 
Simultaneously, it joined the newly founded Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) 
to pursue regional integration projects (Gomes Saraiva, 2010). 
The geostrategic realities of Brazil’s expanding role in the global South, and 
particularly within Latin America, have placed it in the awkward position of being forced to 
absorb some important economic losses. Some of these losses have been taken willingly: an 
expansion of Brazilian exports to and investment in Africa in the past decade has been 
promoted to a large extent by Brazilian government loans to African importers and 
borrowers, channeled mainly via PROEX, Brazil’s equivalent of the U.S. Export-Import 
Bank, and also by BNDES, the giant state-owned development bank. An unknown 
proportion of these loans are of dubious quality, and it is estimated that more than $1 billion 
in loans to African obligors have already had to be written off (World Bank/IPEA 2011, 
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p.99; Pereira da Costa and da Motta Veiga, 2011). But Brazil sought influence in Africa, and 
was willing to spend a portion of its national wealth on this geostrategic priority.  
Other losses have been less willingly entered into. Over the past two decades, as 
Brazil has sought the role of regional and Southern leader, it has not infrequently found that 
its erstwhile partners were not welcoming of its new leadership role (Kahler, 2013, p.725). 
The nationalization of Petrobras refineries in Bolivia in 2006 angered the Lula 
administration, for example, but it decided that in the name of regional comity, and so as to 
avoid the appearance of being an imperious regional hegemon, this slap would be tolerated.  
The most complicated relationships are turning out to be those that Brazil has 
cultivated with Argentina and Venezuela. During the past decade, both those countries have 
been run by increasingly authoritarian governments that have mismanaged their economies, 
discouraging investment and disregarding property and contractual rights through high-
profile nationalizations, discriminatory taxes, and suffocating controls on consumer prices, 
utility rates, foreign trade and capital movements. In both Buenos Aires and Caracas, 
governments have undermined fundamental institutions like the judiciary, the press, the 
central bank, labor unions, business associations, and civil society generally through acts of 
intimidation and abuse of power. 
For reasons that are described in greater detail in previous chapters, Brazilian 
policymakers have not sought to interfere in the internal workings of these countries, even 
when failing to do so has had an increasingly deleterious economic impact on Brazil. Beyond 
the impact on bilateral trade and tourism of restrictions on imports and controls on access to 
foreign exchange, there has been the damage done to Brazilian investments, as seen in the 
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high-profile cases of Vale, Petrobras and América Latina Logística-ALL (Valor Econômico, 
2013). Brazilian companies with still sizeable trading relationships and investment in 
Argentina and Venezuela are currently finding it hard to get their bills paid (Valor Econômico, 
2014).  
The relationship with Bolivarian Venezuela has been the most complex of all bilateral 
relations in the region, leading Brazilian diplomats into a series of potentially expensive 
regional commitments – such as the creation of the Banco do Sul, an “energy ring” of gas 
pipelines, and a joint Brazil-Venezuela oil refinery in Pernambuco – which coopted the late 
Hugo Chávez and reduced his most confrontational postures, but could be gradually 
whittled away by inaction. As Burges (2013, p.588-9) notes, this was a calculated strategy: 
“Brazil adopted a more co-optive negotiating attitude in order to slowly suffocate unwanted 
Venezuelan initiatives and proposals. [President] Chávez was left free to talk and dream with 
little in the way of commentary from Brazil. The Brazilian approach was to let the weight of 
technical details rein in Chávez and quietly maintain Brazil’s pre-eminence.” The UNASUR 
and CELAC groupings, similarly, were seen as a way of simultaneously removing the US and 
Canada from regional discussions, increasing Brazilian influence in the hemisphere, and 
coopting some of the Bolivarian discourse into a larger regional grouping that ideally would 
be headed by Brazil.  
While these geostrategic objectives may seem worthwhile to Brazilian policymakers, 
there can be little doubt that they are expensive, particularly in terms of foregone 
opportunities elsewhere around the world. With the benefit of hindsight, one can certainly 
question whether the South American and African countries on which Brazil has hung its 
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hopes have made a tangible contribution to whatever influence Brazil has gained in the 
world in recent years. For example, while the value of Brazil’s exports and imports with its 
Mercosul partners has tended to increase over time, it has grown far less rapidly than Brazil’s 
trade with the rest of the world. Specifically, Brazil’s trade with Mercosul increased by $40 
billion between 1990 (the year prior to the signing of the Asunción Treaty) and 2013. During 
that same period, however, Brazil’s trade excluding Mercosul increased by a mammoth $390 
billion, and thus the share of Brazil’s trade with Mercosul in total trade has shrunk to a low 
of 9 percent in 2013 from a peak of nearly 17 percent in 1988.xviii Therefore, regardless of 
any efficiency – or inefficiency – effects which the trade alliance may have generated, it can 
be said that in the past decade Mercosul has been more of a drag, rather than a stimulant, in 
terms of propelling Brazil forward to a greater role in global trade.xix 
Figure 4: Brazil’s Merchandise Trade with Mercosul (percent of total trade) 
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This contrasts sharply with the economic strategies followed by other nations in the 
hemisphere. The North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) has been a useful complement 
to the maintenance of the United States’ commanding role in world trade. U.S. trade with 
Canada and Mexico has increased at a faster pace relative to that of U.S. trade with the rest 
of the world: specifically, trade with Canada and Mexico has grown four-fold between 1993 
(the year prior to NAFTA going into effect) and 2013, whereas U.S. trade with countries 
other than Canada and Mexico has expanded by about three-and-a-half times. NAFTA’s 
share in U.S. trade has thus been maintained at almost 30 percent of total during the decade 
2004-2013 versus a pre-NAFTA share of 28 percent in 1993.xx Therefore, beyond the 
efficiency effects which this trade alliance has generated, it can be said that NAFTA has been 
useful in terms of helping to maintain U.S. leadership in global trade. 
The geostrategic gains from Mercosul – including a claim to hemispheric leadership 
and the containment of Bolivarian Venezuela – are also offset by the considerable 
constraints that membership in the imperfect customs union places on Brazil’s freedom of 
action in international trade. Indeed, during the couple of decades that Brazil has chosen to 
wait for the consolidation of a block of regional supporters in order to sit down and 
negotiate key trade and other issues with the likes of China, Europe, Japan and the United 
States, many other countries have already gone ahead on the basis of their own achievements 
– without relying on regional alliances – and they have attained impressive economic-
statecraft objectives.xxi By way of example, Chile and Colombia have negotiated preferential 
trade agreements with about 60 countries each, and Mexico and Peru with some 50 countries 
each.xxii They all have free-trade treaties with the United States, the European Union, and all 
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but Mexico also with the most important countries in Asia. They also have many investment 
promotion and protection agreements with dozens of partners around the world.  
In sharp contrast, Brazil, directly or indirectly through Mercosul, has negotiated and 
ratified trade agreements only with a handful of other South American countries and with 
Israel.xxiii Brazil has also negotiated few, and has ratified no, bilateral investment treaties of 
the kind that have become very popular around the globe. Trade negotiations between 
Mercosul and Europe have been dragging on for fifteen years, and despite recent movement 
on this front, still have little to show. European trade preferences expired at the start of 2014 
for all Mercosul countries except Paraguay, since Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay were 
deemed to be too well off to deserve them. A deal with Europe has been held back 
especially by Argentina and Venezuela, which are not ready to make the same concessions 
that their Mercosul partners are willing to entertain.xxiv Since “Brazil can’t be [held] hostage 
[by] Argentina or Venezuela,” as retired Ambassador Rubens Barbosa rightly declared in his 
new role as representative of the powerful São Paulo Federation of Industries (FIESP),xxv 
the time seems ripe for Brazil to forge ahead on its own, if need be.xxvi 
Indeed, in Mercosul and more broadly, Brazil seems likely to be forced into a 
rethinking of the priority it has traditionally ascribed to geopolitics over economic statecraft. 
Even defenders of the status quo seem to have recognized that the country’s economic 
potential is being hampered by its limited achievements on the international economic stage. 
The National Industrial Confederation (CNI), whose members have in the past advocated 
protectionist, inward-looking industrialization policies, has shifted gears in recent years to 
argue that Mercosul needs to be made more flexible, that other trade negotiations must 
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become a government priority, and that a bilateral agreement with the United States should 
receive consideration.xxvii There seems to be increasing recognition by Brazilian companies 
that without further integration into the global economy, they will not generate the kind of 
high-quality jobs that depend neither on the ups and downs of commodity prices nor on the 
elimination of distortions and restrictions to trade in agricultural products. 
Furthermore, there is a widespread perception among business leaders that Brazil 
may be left by the roadside in the current rush to form major regional trade blocs around the 
world. There is a deep irony here, not least because many of these groupings are coming 
together precisely in order to bypass some of the stickiest roadblocks to the deepening of 
WTO Doha-round negotiations: just when Brazil has gained a leadership role in the WTO 
and thus an opportunity to shape these negotiations, the world seems to be walking away 
from the WTO playground.  
In Latin America, the founding of the Pacific Alliance in mid-2012, by Chile, 
Colombia, Mexico and Peru, is leading to the rapid elimination of trade barriers among its 
members and the increasingly free circulation of goods, services, capital and even people. 
Costa Rica and Panama are in the process of accession and some 30 other market-friendly 
economies (from Canada to Uruguay but not Brazil, and others mainly in Asia and Europe) 
have observer status – and some of the observers are likely to decide in favor of 
membership.xxviii  
Similarly, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) involves the United States plus eleven 
other countries, including Chile, Peru and Mexico, and there is a parallel negotiation between 
the United States and Japan on bilateral market access to the TPP. It is looking like the most 
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important economic initiative to unite the Americas with South-East Asia. The countries in 
the TPP share a commitment to concluding an ambitious agreement that will address many 
of the issues that have proven too difficult to resolve during the Doha Round, like rules for 
free trade in services and technology. As of late 2014, they had gone through about 20 
negotiating rounds, making significant progress on an accelerated track toward conclusion of 
a comprehensive agreement in the months to come.xxix Brazil has so far expressed no 
interest in joining this bloc, even though the grouping looks on target to become the largest 
in the world, including countries representing at least 40 percent of global GDP (depending 
on Japan’s incorporation). 
Finally, there is the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), in which 
the United States and the European Union have been engaged since mid-2013. TTIP is 
aiming to be an ambitious, comprehensive, and high-standard trade and investment 
agreement between parties who already trade a great deal with one another on the basis of 
very low tariffs, and thus it is focused on costly non-tariff barriers, including on agricultural 
goods, and on differences in health and environmental regulations and standards that 
impede the free flow of goods and services across the Atlantic ocean. As of late 2014, the 
United States and the European Union had completed six negotiating rounds.xxx 
At some point, these developments will probably force a change in Brazilian 
economic strategy, although any such change will be constrained by domestic economic 
realities, previous foreign policy commitments, and the challenge of negotiating accession 
into previously formed clubs that may be suspicious of Brazil’s latecomer status. Two paths 
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seem most plausible, and both will require Brazil to modify its current economic and 
geostrategic policy priorities.  
The first path involves an acknowledgement that the world is heading toward a global 
economy made up of several super-blocs: the Trans Pacific Partnership, the Trans-Atlantic 
Partnership, the European Union, China’s own economic bloc with its neighbors, and within 
Latin America, the Pacific Alliance. There is much to be gained from Brazil’s joining a bloc 
such as the Pacific Alliance, which might open up the country to its western neighbors, and 
through them, further build bridges to Asia. Doing so, however, would require a serious 
commitment to phasing out Brazilian protectionist policies, as well as the dilution of its 
geopolitical ambitions for, and economic commitments to, Mercosul.  
If Brazil wishes to stay out of the super-blocs, then the second path involves placing 
all its bets on a strengthened multilateral approach to global trade governance, in which case 
Brazil’s private sector and political elites will have to double down on their support of 
Roberto Azevêdo and the WTO’s agenda. To be consistent with this wager on 
multilateralism, however, Brazil would likewise have to tame its “neo-developmentalist” 
policies and be prepared to make serious liberalizing concessions. xxxi In the wake of the last 
WTO ministerial which took place in Bali in December 2013, a fresh negotiating approach is 
needed, without which the Doha Round will remain moribund. The recent, limited progress 
in what is now a modest, WTO trade-facilitation agenda threatens to leave Brazil 
marginalized in a world that is marching on and does not seem to be constrained by a 
deadlocked WTO.  
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